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Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
Carbon County Coal Company: Risk Assumption
in Claims of Impossibility, Impracticability, and
Frustration of Purpose
While Anglo-American law steadfastly adheres to the principle that individuals
should enjoy full freedom to contract, courts have nonetheless recognized that
absolute enforcement of contractual obligation is not always desirable. For example,
parties seeking enforcement of a previously agreed upon contractual provision will be
unable to resort to judicial intervention should the subject matter of their contract be
illegal.' Agreements may be similarly void or voidable if made between minors or
between minors and persons who have reached majority. 2 Generally, judicial
rejection of these contracts creates little disagreement.
Dispute, however, does arise when courts set aside obligations solely because
exceptional events occur after contract formation. Events that defeat all potential
methods of contract performance may insulate a party from a suit for damages or
specific performance since compliance would be impossible. 3 Should the entire
purpose of the contract be subverted by a later occurrence, the defense of frustration
of purpose may also apply. 4 Finally, if events that take place after contract formation
dramatically increase the costs of performance, relief from liability may be effected
through the defense known as commercial impracticability. 5
An opportunity to explore the impossibility, frustration of purpose, and
commercial impracticability defenses arose in 1986, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to set aside a long-term contract executed in
1978 between Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO), a utility, and its
coal supplier, Carbon County Coal Company (Carbon County). 6 The buyer had
brought suit claiming that it should be excused from its obligations under a twenty-
year contract specifying that NIPSCO would buy and Carbon County would sell
approximately 1.5 million tons of coal each year.7 The contract's twenty-four dollars
1. See, e.g., RESTATemqNT (SEcoND) oF CorRAcrS § 7 (1979).
2. See, e.g., id. § 8 (1979).
3. Impossible performance might result when a party to a personal services contract has died or when the subject
matter of a contract has been destroyed. See, e.g., id. §§ 261-63.
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265, "Discharge by Supervening Frustration," states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made,
his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
Id. § 265.
5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, "Discharge by Supervening Impracticability," states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence
of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
Id. § 261.
6. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (NIPSCO).
7. Id. at 265-66.
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per ton price was subject to escalation provisions; in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, the price rose to forty-four dollars per ton by 1985.8 When the court
denied NIPSCO permission to pass the increased price of the utility's coal onto
customers, NIPSCO sought release from its contract with Carbon County. NIPSCO
alleged that its performance was excused under doctrines of impossibility, imprac-
ticability, and frustration of purpose. 9
Judge Posner, writing for the court, completely rejected NIPSCO's claim.10 In
so doing, he reflected American judicial aversion to excusing voluntarily assumed
obligations after superseding events render performance onerous. 1 The NIPSCO
decision appropriately suggested that the Uniform Commercial Code's impractica-
bility provision, section 2-615,12 applies to buyers as well as to sellers. 13 Moreover,
although Judge Posner concluded that the utility's failure to negotiate for a price ceiling
in its contract conclusively assigned to NIPSCO any risk of inflated costs, 14 the result
8. Id. at 267.
9. Id. at 267-68.
10. Id. at 277-78.
11. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (contract for the
sale of potash enforced although the seller's performance was made economically burdensome due to government
regulation); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (obligation to deliver goods to buyer
using alternate, more costly route was not excused); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966)
(computer supplier was not excused from contract although the corporation encountered engineering problems after the
formation of its contract); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(corporation's unqualified obligation to dispose of waste was not excused although severe losses resulted from reversal
of government policy regarding nuclear waste disposal); Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (performance was not excused although financial difficulty and economic hardship, even to the point of insolvency,
made performance difficult or impossible), aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (increase in cost of aviation fuel to supplier did not excuse its performance under a
long-term supply contract with airline); Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (performance of contract to supply "Spirits Grade Ethanol" was not excused although there was almost
a 50% increase in the cost of performance); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct.
App.) (coal supplier required to perform as specified in requirements contract although energy shortage drastically
increased the cost of supplier's performance), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 865 (1979); Maple Farms v. City School Dist. of
Elmira, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (fixed price contract for the sale of milk was not set aside
although supplier's cost was subject to market fluctuations). Compare Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499
F. Supp. 53 (w.D. Pa. 1980) (ALCOA) (relief granted to producer of aluminum when contract price failed to reflect the
increased costs of aluminum manufacturing and loss was alleged to be over $60 million) with Mineral Park Land Co. v.
Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (obligation released when cost of production would be 10 to 12 times the
specified contract price).
12. U.C.C. § 2-615, "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions," states:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on
substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and
(c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he
must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include regular customers
not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any
manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation
is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). [The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be referred to as the U.C.C. or the UCC].
13. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1986). See infra
note 43.
14. Id. at 275.
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reached is nonetheless consistent with case law1 5 and the Restatement of Contracts. 16
The Restatement's position suggests that the impracticability defense should be
available when an event, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made, occurs subsequent to the contract's formation and
renders the party's performance impracticable. 17 The Restatement also indicates that
where either the contract language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, or
where the contingency's occurrence is the fault of one of the parties, a defense
premised on impracticability will not lie. 18
This Note will introduce the impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of
purpose defenses. It will then describe the circumstances giving rise to the NIPSCO
dispute and will explore the implications of the Seventh Circuit's decision. Greatest
attention will be paid, however, to the manner in which the NIPSCO court limited its
review to the nature of the contract and to the contract's price terms. 19
Specifically, this Note suggests that the Seventh Circuit's refusal to consider the
totality of circumstances surrounding negotiation may discourage the formation of
agreements. A court's limited factual inquiry to ascertain the assignment of certain
risks may require parties to insist upon protective contractual clauses to excuse
performance should any remote event take place. Conversely, courts may be free to
deny impossibility and related defenses on the sole ground that the omission of an
exculpatory provision constituted an implicit assumption of risk. Ultimately, indi-
viduals may be deterred from entering into obligations in which the contracting
environment is inherently complex or changing.
This Note contends that an analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding
15. See generally Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of
Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTrNGS L.J. 1393 (1969); Dawson, Judicial Revision of
Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1984); Duesenberg, "Impossibility": It Isn't Good Code
Language, 1 J.L. & Cost. 29 (1981), reprinted in 24 Corp. Prac. Comm. (Callaghan) 1 (1982); Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Goldberg, Price Adjustment in
Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 527; Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability:
Searching for "'the Wisdom of Solomon, " 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1123 (1987); Jennings, Commercial Impracticability-Does
It Really Exist?, 2 WivrrnmR L. REv. 241 (1980); Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic
Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REv. 457 (1986); Schwarz, Sales Law and
Inflation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1976); Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility,
14 U.C.C. L.J. 30, 146 (parts 1 & 2) (1981); Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial
Impracticability, 69 MrtN. L. Rev. 471 (1985); Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 203
(1979); Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Excusing the Impracticable, 60 B.U.L. RFv. 575 (1980) (authored by John Gerald Ryan)
[hereinafter Excusing the Impracticable]; Note, Court-Imposed Modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing
Approach to Discharge Cases, 44 Ono ST. L.J. 1079 (1983) (authored by Robert W. Reeder III) [hereinafter
Court-Imposed Modifications]; Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615: Commercial Impracticability from
the Buyer's Perspective, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 518 (1978) (authored by Arthur Nakazato) [hereinafter Commercial Impracti-
cability].
16. RESTAThiENr (SECOND) OF COrNRAS § 261 (1979).
17. ld, § 261 and comment c.
18. Id. § 261 and comment d.
19. This Note does not attempt to identify under what general circumstances an encumbered promisor ought to be
relieved of contractual obligation because of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose. Instead, the
discussion focuses on what facts should be relevant to a court's determination that particular risks have been assumed, the
consequence of which is the unavailability of those defenses to a particular party.
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the parties at contract formation should control whether the participants intended
performance, notwithstanding the effects of ensuing events. While arguably this
approach requires additional judicial resources, any associated costs are substantially
outweighed by the benefits of a totality of circumstances test. Consideration of the
entire contracting environment accurately reflects economic reality embracing
contract formation and enables courts to determine what, in fact, parties intended by
their agreement.
I. IMPOSSIBILITY, FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE, AND COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABIIrrY
Over the past 300 years, courts have drastically altered the way in which they
view the promise to perform under contract. Excuse from contractual obligation
based upon impossibility was originally limited to cases in which performance by the
promisor was rendered physically impossible.20 Because of the severe judicial
requirement that only express provisions in the contract might provide relief from
obligation, parties sought to avoid oppressive performance by incorporating force
majeure clauses in their contracts to excuse either the buyer's or the seller's
performance should certain episodes occur, such as acts of God or acts of law.2'
However, the force majeure clause could only guard against those events that were
20. Strict adherence to contractual obligation is best illustrated by the English case Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep.
897 (K.B. 1647), in which a lessee was required to pay rent under a lease contract although a hostile army occuppied the
building and the lessee was unable to use the property. The court declared that "[when the party by his own contract
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract." Id. at 897.
Courts recognize the defense of impossibility in those cases in which "performance itself is made impracticable,
without regard to the particular party who is to perform." This practice is known as the recognition of "objective,"
rather than "subjective," impossibility. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNrTRAcrs § 261 comment e (1979). See, e.g., B's
Co. v. B.P. Barber & Assocs., 391 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1968) (in which impossibility personal to the promisor did not
excuse performance); Harris v. Waikane Corp., 484 F. Supp. 372 (D. Haw. 1980) (court stating that objective
impossibility will usually be required); Slaughter v. C.I.T. Corp., 229 Ala. 411, 157 So. 463 (1934) (delay in payment
of debt not excused although delay due to bank's folding during economic depression). But see Alabama Football v.
Wright, 452 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (failure of business enterprise released entity from payment of salary due),
aff'd, 607 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1979).
21. "Such clause[s] fare] common in... contracts to protect parties in the event that a part of the contract cannot
be performed due to causes which are outside the control of the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care."
BLAcK's LAW DiCTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
A typical force majeure clause may appear as:
If either party is rendered unable by force majeure, or any other cause of any kind not reasonably within its
control, wholly or in part, to perform or comply with any obligation or condition of this Agreement, upon such
party's giving timely notice and reasonably full particulars to the other party such obligation or condition shall
be suspended during the continuance of the inability so caused and such party shall be relieved of liability and
shall suffer no prejudice for failure to perform the same during such period; provided obligations to make
payments then due for products delivered hereunder shall not be suspended. The cause of the suspension (other
than strikes or differences with workmen) shall be remedied so far as possible with reasonable dispatch.
Settlement of strikes or differences with workmen shall be wholly within the discretion of the party having the
difficulty. The party having the difficulty shall notify the other party of any change in circumstances giving rise
to the suspension of its performance and of its resumption of performance under this Agreement. The term
"force majeure" shall include, without limitation by the following enumeration, acts of God, and the public
enemy, the elements, fire, accidents, breakdowns, strikes, differences with workmen, and any other industrial,
civil or public disturbance, or any act or omission beyond the control of the party having the difficulty, and any
restrictions or restraints imposed by laws, orders, rules, regulations or acts of any government or governmental
body or authority, civil or military.
Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99
(1987).
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sufficiently foreseeable; it was incapable of protecting parties from events that were
so unlikely to take place that they were not specified in the exculpatory provision.
The judiciary responded by implying conditions to performance that the courts felt
were embraced by the nature of the contract.2 2 The failure of these conditions would
in turn represent a defense to contract available to either a buyer or a seller.23 It
followed from application of this implied-condition principle that the death of a party
to a personal services contract or the destruction of a contract's subject matter
excused performance. 24 The bases for an implied-condition excuse were few,
however, and the impossibility claim remained of relatively scarce applicability.
American courts dramatically liberalized the theory of impossibility in Mineral Park
Land Co. v. Howard,a5 in which the buyer's performance of a contract to excavate
gravel was physically possible, but only at a cost to him of ten to twelve times the
agreed contract price. The court's finding that the commercial impracticability due to
this aggravated cost amounted to impossibility and therefore excused performance 26
was later adopted by the Restatement and incorporated into UCC section 2-615.27
Consistent with the liberalization of impossibility defenses found in Mineral
Park, contemporary application of the defenses was not limited to sellers. Indeed, the
frustration of purpose doctrine evolved to afford particular protection to buyers.
Frustration of purpose implies that while performance is possible, contractual
obligation will nevertheless be extinguished if the purpose of the contract has been
defeated. 28 Since payment for goods or services is rarely an obligation that is
objectively impossible or one that becomes burdensome enough to constitute
22. For a brief discussion of these implied conditions, see Jennings, supra note 15.
23. The doctrine of implied conditions had its genesis in the English case Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309
(Q.B. 1863), in which the destruction of a theater after the defendant had procured its use for the purpose of giving
concerts relieved the defendant from his obligation to pay rent. In this case, the court stated:
The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence
of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing
of the person or thing shall excuse the performance. In none of the cases is the promise in words other than
positive, nor is there any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing shall excuse the
performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because from the nature of the contract it is apparent that the
parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular person or chattel.
Id. at 314. The implied condition principle had also been adopted in America by 1883, see, e.g., The Tornado, 108 U.S.
342, 351 (1883), yet some commentators still express dissatisfaction with the implied-condition theory. See, e.g., 6 A.
CoRstN, CoRtsN o. Co.NTRACrs § 1331, at 355-61 (1962); 18 S. Wu.LsroN, A TP.AiEs ON THE LAW OF CONmRAcrS § 1937,
at 32-35 (3d ed. 1978).
24. RESrAteET (SEcoND) OF CorNRAS §§ 262-63 (1979).
25. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
26. Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460 ("A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing
is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.").
27. The impracticability defense is incorporated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 and in U.C.C. §
2-615. See supra notes 5 & 12.
28. The Coronation case provides the classic example of frustration. In Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.),
a lessee was released from his obligation to pay rent for a room he had leased to watch a parade for King Edward VII.
When the King became ill and the parade was canceled, the lessee was not required to perform under his contract. The
court found that where the object of the contract perishes at or before the time for performance, the purpose of the contract
is frustrated, and the promisor is relieved from his obligation. Id. at 749-50. A recent example of an American court's
application of frustration may be found in West Los Angeles Institiute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225
(9th Cir. 1966) (where the purpose of a sale-leaseback agreement was to avoid tax expense and after contract formation
the tax code was changed so that any tax benefit from the transaction was lost, the obligation was discharged),cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1010 (1967).
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impracticability, frustration may be a particularly useful defense to a buyer whose
only contractual obligation is tendering payment. Similar to the doctrines of
impossibility and impracticability, the frustration of purpose defense is conditioned
upon the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption
of the contract. 29 Applying the frustration doctrine in Aluminum Co. of America v.
Essex Group, Inc. (ALCOA), 30 a district court held that performance was excused
because a continuation of the contractual relationship would have otherwise resulted
in extreme losses to the buyer. 3' The buyer successfully asserted that the primary
purpose of the disputed contract was to procure profits.32 Agreeing that unprofitabil-
ity had frustrated the buyer's principal purpose, the court allowed the frustration of
purpose defense and released the buyer from further obligation. The precedential use
of ALCOA is indeterminable because the case has not yet been followed; however,
the holding does suggest a particularly expansive application of the frustration of
purpose defense.
Much case law clarifying the impossibility, impracticability, and frustration
doctrines reiterates the requirement of severe loss, the risk of which the party seeking
release did not assume. 33 Generally, increases in the cost of performance less extreme
than those that occurred in Mineral Park will not satisfy the requirements of any of
these defenses, even when huge aggregate losses have been demonstrated. 34
Moreover, courts look to alternative means of performance by the parties to
determine if the burden of performance is sufficiently onerous, creating an additional
hurdle to the formation of a successful claim. 35
29. See supra note 4. See also Columbian Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Township Title Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796
(D. Kan. 1987) (refusing to grant relief although purpose of contract frustrated, because frustrating event was both
foreseeable and controllable by the parties); Denali Seafoods, Inc. v. Western Pioneer, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 580 (W.D.
Wash. 1980) (disallowing frustration of purpose defense because frustrating event was not an unexpected contingency and
because contract provisions relating to maintenance, repair, and insurance constituted express and implied assumptions
of risk).
30. 499 F. Supp. 53 (,V.D. Pa. 1980).
31. Id. at 73.
32. Id. When ALCOA's contract became unprofitable due to increased costs that were passed to the buyer, the
contract's purpose was frustrated and ALCOA was released. As of the publication of this Note, the district court's
application of commercial frustration has not been followed in any other reported decision.
33. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (additional expense of
$44,000 to perform shipping contract was not enough to constitute impracticability); Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International
Printing Local 56, 584 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (multiemployer bargaining association, asking for judicial
reformation of union contract, did not assert an actionable frustration of purpose claim when the association's possible
losses represented less than 6% of total wages payable under contract); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981) (losses in t.xcess of $100 million did not excuse performance); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (cost increase greater than 40% in raw material over
life of contract did not constitute impracticability); Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (nearly 50% increase in cost of performance was insufficient to justify impracticability
defense); Maple Farms v. City School Dist. of Elmira, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (23%
increase in the cost of performance was insufficient to discharge performance). Cf. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,
172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (cost of performance greater than 10 to 12 times the contract price excused performance).
See also E. FARNswoRTH, CoNmTacrA §§ 9.6-9.9, at 681-705 (1982).
34. Compare Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (obligation was not
excused although increase in cost of raw material to supplier was over $100,000); Westinghouse 517 F. Supp. 440 (losses
in excess of $100 million did not excuse performance); Publicker, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (losses in excess
of $1.5 million not sufficient to invoke impracticability defense) with ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53 (alleged losses in excess
of $60 million were relevant to finding impracticability requirement met).
35. See, e.g., Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 409 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (defense of commercial
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Overall, the origin and development of the impossibility, impracticability, and
frustration doctrines suggest potentially absolute protection from unfortunate subse-
quent events, but protection that remains relatively unavailable to buyers and sellers.
This brief synopsis of the impossibility, impracticability, and frustration contract
defenses will be helpful to the following exposition of the NIPSCO dispute 36 and
discussion of the Seventh Circuit's response to NIPSCO's commercial impractica-
bility claim.
II. THE NIPSCO DispuTE
In 1978 NIPSCO and Carbon County entered into an agreement whereby
NIPSCO would purchase and Carbon County would sell approximately 1.5 million
tons of coal each year for twenty years. 37 By the mid-1970s, fuel prices had
skyrocketed as a result of the recent oil embargo and companies like NIPSCO were
eager to guarantee long-term accessibility to energy supplies.3 8 Contracts evidencing
this eagerness might be expected to provide price escalation provisions; purchasers
and suppliers were then acutely aware of the upward movement of energy prices and
orchestrated contract negotiations accordingly. When fuel prices suddenly plum-
meted, however, those parties who had initially contracted in an environment of
ever-increasing fuel costs were often burdened with agreements that addressed only
an anticipated rise in supply costs.
NIPSCO's Carbon County contract contained an escalation provision as an
accommodation to expected increasing fuel prices. In accordance with the escalation
clause, NIPSCO's cost of coal rose from an initial twenty-four dollars per ton to
forty-four dollars per ton by 1985. 3 9 Ultimately, NIPSCO sought to pass to customers
the increased cost of coal it used to generate electricity. The regulatory commission
refused the requested rate increases, however, citing the availability of electricity that
NIPSCO could purchase and resell to customers for less than the cost of internal
production. 40
Thereafter, NIPSCO brought suit for relief from the Carbon County contract in
federal district court claiming, among others, the defenses of impossibility, imprac-
ticability, and frustration of purpose. 41 Upon the district court's holding for Carbon
County, NIPSCO appealed the unfavorable decision. The Seventh Circuit, however,
impracticability disallowed after court noted that the defense could be "utilized only when the promisor [had] exhausted
all its alternatives, when in fact it is determined that all means of performance are commercially senseless"); Transatlantic
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (although the assumed method of performance, sailing
through the Suez Canal, was rendered impossible, an alternate and much more costly route around Cape of Good Hope
was possible so performance was not excused). But cf. Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska),
modified on reh'g, 523 P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1974) (icy conditions made delivery across frozen lake impossible and,
although an alternate route was possible, the alternative had not been contemplated by parties and was not chargeable to
the promisor), aff'd, 562 P.2d 1053 (Alaska 1977).
36. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 265-66.
38. Id. See also Mastery Over World Oil Supply Shifts to Producing Countries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1973, at 1,
col. 1.
39. NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 267.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 268.
1989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:163
affirmed the lower court's judgment.42 Judge Posner's circuit court opinion discussed
the likelihood that impossibility defenses would be available to buyers under Indiana
law43 but nevertheless held that NIPSCO failed to plead proper excuse by force
majeure44 or by impossibility. 45
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of NIPSCO's impossibility defense was
straightforward: because the contract by its own terms fixed prices the buyer would
pay, it explicitly assigned to the buyer any risk of price increases.46 Risk assumption
42. Id.
43. While the district court in NIPSCO maintained that a buyer could not claim impossibility defenses under
Indiana's commercial statutes, Judge Posner suggested in dicta that buyers should receive such protection. NIPSCO, 799
F.2d at 277-78. Indiana's code, identical to UCC § 2-615, "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions," does not
mention applicability of the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose defenses to the buyer, however, there
is ample evidence to support Judge Posner's conclusion that buyers should nevertheless benefit from the statute. IrD. Cone
Ar. § 26-1-2-615 (West Supp. 1988-89). Case law that the Code sought to embody never distinguished between the
buyer and the seller in application of these defenses. See supra Part I. Instead, the statute was enacted to "liberate the
courts from the old restrictive concepts of excuse." Commercial Impracticability, supra note 15, at 533. See also
Wallach, supra note 15, at 212-13. Karl Llewellyn, principal drafter of Article 2 of the UCC, noted an intent to liberate
the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose. Prance, supra note 15, at 459 n.4.
Indeed, the UCC's comment 9 to § 2-615 suggests that the defense of commercial impracticability should be
available to the buyer, stating that "the present section may well apply and entitle the buyer to the exemption." U.C.C.
§ 2-615 comment 9 (1978). The Permanent Editorial Board does not support similar amendments since it believes § 2-615
may already be read to include excuse when appropriate. Commercial Impracticability, supra note 15, at 521-22 n.9.
Mississippi, for example, recognized the sensibility of allowing buyers protection under its § 2-615 and expressly stated
in its statutes that buyers are entitled to the § 2-615 defense. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-615 (1972). Similarly, the Iowa
Supreme Court in Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976), indicated that impracticability
claims should be available to buyers. See also Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 894, 702 P.2d
930, 932 (Ct. App. 1985); Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940,953-56,461 N.E.2d 1049, 1060
(1984) (indicating the defense should be available to the buyer). Parallel statutes, however, have been construed as not
extending § 2-615 protection to buyers. See International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
Nevertheless, in light of the historical background of the excuse doctrines and the intent of UCC § 2-615 to loosen
the strict requirements of impossibility and impracticability, it is unlikely that the Indiana statute was drafted with the
intention to limit its application to sellers. While Indiana does not expressly extend the benefits of UCC § 2-615 to buyers,
Indiana Code § 26-1-1-103 authorizes "the principles of law and equity [to] supplement [the Code's] provisions." IND.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-103 (West Supp. 1988-89). However, Indiana's own official comments "seem critical of [U.C.C.]
comment 9: 'Comment 9 discusses exemption for the buyer, but the text of the section is applicable only to sellers."' IND.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-615, quoted in NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 277. Notwithstanding the Indiana comment, allowing buyers
the defenses articulated under § 2-615 would balance the expansion of the doctrine that has already benefited sellers and
ultimately effect the purposes of the Code.
44. NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 277-78. The force majeure clause stated that NIPSCO would be relieved of its obligation
to take delivery of coal "for any cause beyond [its] reasonable control... including but not limited to ... orders or acts
of civil ... authority ... which wholly or partly prevent ... the utilizing of the coal." Id. at 274.
Judge Posner dismissed NIPSCO's argument that its force majeure clause excused performance, recognizing that
neither the utility commission's order nor market fluctuations were covered by the exculpatory provision. Id. at 275, 278.
There had been no order by the commission not to take delivery of Carbon County's coal; the order only refused to allow
NIPSCO to pass the additional cost to customers. Moreover, Judge Posner added that "[b]y signing the kind of contract
it did, NIPSCO gambled that fuel costs would rise rather than fall over the life of the contract .... If such a gamble fails,
the result is not force majeure." Id. at 275. Other courts have also refused to classify similar market activities asforce
majeure. In Langham-Hill Petro. Co. v. Southern Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987),
the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of defendant's claim that a collapse in oil prices, caused by Saudi Arabian
attempts to regain market share, constituted force majeure and relieved the defendant of contractual obligation. The
appellate court also supported a sanction of attorney's fees against the defendant because the defendant had asserted a
claim that the court felt was "not warranted by existing law." Id. at 1330. A discussion offorce majeure clauses and UCC
§ 2-615 may be found in Wallach, supra note 15, at 221-24.
45. NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 275.
46. Id. at 278. Judge Posner described the operation of fixed-price contracts:
The normal risk of a fixed-price contract is that the market price will change. If it rises, the buyer gains at the
expense of the seller (except insofar as escalation provisions give the seller some protection); if it falls, as here,
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was thus conclusively presumed by both the terms and the nature of the parties'
agreement. Interpreting the contract in this way effectively precluded NIPSCO from
claiming impossibility, impracticability, or frustration since those defenses require
that the pleading party not have assumed the risk of an otherwise excusing event. 47
The decision ultimately reached in NIPSCO may have been appropriate under
the facts of that case; however, the court's use of a conclusive presumption to assign
the risk of loss may not be wise. The remaining discussion addresses court-
determined assumption of risk and suggests that a totality of circumstances test is
appropriate in the resolution of impossibility claims.
Iil. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE NEED FOR A TOTALITY OF
CkcuMsTANcEs TEST
A. Assumption of Risk
The U.C.C.'s and Restatement's impossibility, impracticability, and frustration
of purpose provisions all condition excuse on the failure to find certain risks assumed
by the parties. If an obligor has implicitly or explicitly assumed the risk of a
contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the parties, his
claim will fail. 48 To determine if a party otherwise has assumed the risk of a
superseding event, courts have looked to a number of criteria: the nature and purpose
of the contract, 49 the bargaining process,5 0 the ability to bear risk,51 and, most
notably, the foreseeability of the aggravating event.5 2
the seller gains at the expense of the buyer. The whole purpose of a fixed-price contract is to allocate risk this
way.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found Judge Posner's reasoning convincing and concluded that fixed-price
contracts constitute explicit assignments of risk. Langham-Hill, 813 F.2d at 1330 ("If fixed-price contracts can be avoided
due to fluctuations in price, then the entire purpose of fixed-price contracts, which is to protect both the buyer and the
seller from the risks of the market, is defeated."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987).
47. For a discussion of the utility of the court's conclusive presumption, see Part II, infra.
48. For example, both the Restatement and the U.C.C. condition impracticability and frustration of purpose claims
on the claiming party's failure to have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, risks of subsequent contingencies. RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND) oF Co.wmnrcrs § 261 comment c, § 265 comment a (1978). See also U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8.
49. See, e.g., Maple Farms v. City School Dist. of Elmira, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(fixed-price contract expressly entered into by buyer to protect buyer from market fluctuations).
50. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944) (foreseeable contingency should have been
provided for in contract, so absence of a provision guarding against the contingency gave rise to the inference that the risk
of its occurrence was assumed). See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
See also comment 8 to U.C.C. § 2-615:
Thus, the exemptions of this section do not apply when the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed
at the time of contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be regarded as part of the
dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial interpretation from the
circumstances....
U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8 (1978).
51. Judge Posner discusses the ability both to foresee and to control risk as determinative factors in allowing parties
to claim impracticability. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 15. See also Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses
Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932) (because middleman could have protected against the contingency that certain
suppliers would close had he contracted with other suppliers for conditional purchase of goods, impracticability was
disallowed); Arnold v. Ray Charles Enter., 264 N.C. 92, 141 S.E.2d 14 (1965) (defendant's control over airplane and
ability to prevent its malfunction defeated impossibility claim).
52. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (government
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When contracts are specifically designed to insulate parties from the risk of an
event, it is understandable that courts refuse to set aside the agreement merely
because circumstances arise that bear out the purpose of the contract. Thus, for
example, when a school district specifically sought protection from market fluctua-
tions by entering into a fixed price purchase agreement with a milk supplier, the court
estopped the seller from asserting that increased costs of supply made performance
commercially impracticable.5 3 Courts have also examined the bargaining process of
particular claimants who later assert excusing defenses to their contracts. In Scullin
Steel Co. v. PACCAR, Inc. ,54 the defendant in a suit for breach had originally tried
to include an excusing clause in its contract during negotiations, but failed. Because
of this fruitless bargaining at contract formation, the court would not relieve the
defendant from obligation under its final agreement. Instead, the court extrapolated
from the omission of an excusing provision the parties' intent not to release obligation
under certain circumstances. 55
Impossibility and commercial impracticability claims have also been rejected
when the party seeking excuse was best able to bear the risk of loss due to an event's
occurrence. 56 Judge Posner suggests that "[iln every discharge case the basic
problem is the same: to decide who should bear the loss resulting from an event that
has rendered performance by one party uneconomical.' '7 Judge Posner characterizes
the superior risk bearer as the party who can estimate both the magnitude and the
probability of loss and who can insure against exposure. 58 A classic application of
risk-bearing analysis resulted in the disallowance of impossibility defenses to a
"middleman" who could have contracted with other suppliers for the conditional
purchase of goods, thereby protecting himself from the hazard of a supplier's
nonperformance. 59 Because the "middleman" had been contributorily negligent in
failing to guard against subsequent nondelivery by suppliers, his impossibility and
impracticability claims were rejected.
The foreseeability of specific contingencies similarly has been a crucial factor in
many cases addressing assumption of risk and impossibility. 60 While it is not
necessarily required by U.C.C. section 2-615 that an excusing contingency be
regulation sufficiently foreseeable to deny excuse); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966)
(engineering problems foreseeable in construction of an innovative computer system so claim of impracticability
disallowed); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (foresecability of fuel crisis
sufficient to defeat impracticability claim); Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 310
N.E.2d 363 (1974) (labor strike was foreseeable so its occurrence could not constitute an event upon which an
impracticability claim could be founded); Maple Farms, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (change in price of milk
supply foreseeable and therefore could not be foundation of impracticability defense). See also U.C.C. § 2-615 comment
8 (1978).
53. Maple Farms, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784. Judge Posner's NIPSCO decision similarly viewed the
utility's coal contract. See supra note 46.
54. 708 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), appeal after remand. 748 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
55. Id. at 762. The Scullin court refused to allow a frustration defense, finding that both the "language and the
circumstances ... indicate[d]" that discharge was not intended by the parties. Id.
56. See supra note 51.
57. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 15, at 86 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 117.
59. See Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
60. See supra note 52.
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unforeseeable, 6t foreseeability's relevance is based on the simple theory that the
"non-occurrence of a contingency cannot be fairly said to be a basic assumption of
the parties if its occurrence was foreseeable.' '62 While the Restatement's drafters
recognized that foreseeability may be probative of a party's intent, the comments to
the impracticability section do not view foreseeability as conclusive. 63 Nevertheless,
courts have maintained that when a contingency was foreseeable or should have been
contemplated by the parties, the risk of its occurrence falls on that party who could
have guarded himself against loss by bargaining for certain contract terms or by
insuring against possible loss. 64 Therefore, courts frequently construe contractual
silence as an allocation of risk, concluding that either party could have expressly
conditioned performance upon the nonoccurrence of a foreseeable contingency. 65
Absolute unforeseeability, however, may not always be required for a successful
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose defense. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, rejected a requirement of
absolute unforeseeability stating: "The occurrence . . . must be unexpected but it
does not necessarily have to have been unforeseeable. A requirement of absolute
non-foreseeability as a condition to the application of the doctrine would be so
logically inconsistent that in effect it would nullify the doctrine.' "66
Because it is almost always foreseeable that costs of performance may fluctuate
61. The text of the UCC's impracticability provision, UCC § 2-615, does not mention foreseeability except to the
extent that the contingency must have been one for which nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the parties. U.C.C.
§ 2-615 (1978). However, comment I to § 2-615 apparently requires the unforeseeability of a subsequent event to afford
excuse under the Code. "This section excuses . . . where . . . performance has become commercially impracticable
because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting
.... U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 1 (1978) (emphasis added).
Eliminating any requirement of unforeseeability that courts may have imputed to § 2-615 has been suggested. See
Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1032, 1038 (1978).
62. Duesenberg, supra note 15, at 42. Courts have emphasized the importance of foreseeability. See, e.g., Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Maple Farms v. City School Dist. of Elmira, 76
Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Record Corp. v. Logan Constr. Co., 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 358 (1982)
(labor strike at defendant's company did not meet courts "test of foreseeability" when labor strike could have been
foreseen). But see Vest Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 229 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1010 (1967); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Foreseeability
or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation.").
63. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 states:
If the supervening event was not reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, the party claiming
discharge can hardly be expected to have provided against its occurrence. However, if it was reasonably
foreseeable, or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not necessarily follow. Factors such as the practical
difficulty of reaching agreement on the myriad of conceivable terms of a complex agreement may excuse a
failure to deal with improbable contingencies.
REsTAT E4r (SECOND) OF Co,¢ CrarS § 261 comment c (1979) (emphasis added).
64. See supra notes 51 & 52.
65. This seems to be an application of the older doctrine of impossibility set forth in Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep.
897 (K.B. 1647), discussed supra at note 20.
66. Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Foundation for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (4th Cir.
1987). The circuit court maintained:
After all, ... practically any occurrence can be foreseen but whether the foreseeability is sufficient to render
unacceptable the defense of impossibility is "one of degree" of the foreseeability and whether the
non-occurrence of the event was sufficiently unlikely or unreasonable to constitute a reason for refusing to apply
the doctrine. And that is the rule which we think accords with modem reasoning of the doctrine as an equitable
doctrine and is the one we approve.
Id. at 1101-02. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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after contract formation, courts that adopt a foreseeability test in assigning risk of loss
have placed the burden of unprofitable market activity on parties who agreed to
certain price terms. A number of decisions consistent with NIPSCO rely upon the
presumably explicit allocation of risk to the buyer or seller inferred from an obligor's
failure to protect himself by not insisting on a price ceiling or floor or by assenting
to a fixed-price contract. In Publicker Industries v. Union Carbide Corp.,67 the
inclusion of a ceiling on the contract price provided the basis for a determination that
the seller impliedly assumed the risk of future price increases. 68 A failure to condition
a contract for the sale of fuel on a particular price for the commodity similarly
undermined a claim of impossibility in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.69
These cases are representative; courts are often unsympathetic to defendants'
contentions that unexpected prices or costs constitute unforeseeable events against
which the parties should not have been required to guard. 70
Theories focusing on the foreseeability of events have also been employed when
parties contract in an arena of abnormal risk.71 Here, events that could not have been
foreseen at contract formation may arise subsequent to the agreement, yet may be
insufficient to excuse performance if contracting parties were undertaking unusually
large risks in originally assuming their obligations. Acting within a "penumbra of
risk" may thus be itself an assumption of risk of later contingencies. 72 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in In re Westinghouse73
penalized parties who had contracted in "conscious ignorance" of possible contin-
gencies: the court credited to the defendant an assumption of risk for any subsequent
67. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ceiling on the contract price implied that risks of
increase in price would be borne by seller).
68. Id. But see Freidco of Wilmington, Del. v. Farmers Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981) (discussing the
presence of a price cap and rejecting the argument that the cap operates to assign risk under all circumstances).
69. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
70. See, e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (performance
in accordance with requirements expressly stated in the contract was required although drastic increases in the cost of
performance were experienced), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 865 (1979).
71. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 441-42 (failure to condition contract on specific prices
undermined claim for excuse); Scullin Steel Co. v. PACCAR, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (failure to
exclude noncancellation provision precluded impracticability defense), appeal after remand, 748 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1966) (computer supplier acted
in penumbra of risk when it contracted for construction of innovative computer system); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981) (entering long-term contract in nuclear industry at time when
industry's future was uncertain precluded impracticability defense). Cf. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In
ALCOA, the parties' attempt to limit risk within a "penumbra of uncertainty" defeated the opposing party's claim that
ALCOA acted in conscious ignorance of risks. The ALCOA court suggested:
Once courts recognize that supposed specific values lie, and are commonly understood to lie, within a penumbra
of uncertainty, and that the range of probability is subject to estimation, the principle of conscious uncertainty
requires reformulation. The proper question is not simply whether the parties to a contract were conscious of
uncertainty with respect to a vital fact, but whether they believed that uncertainty was effectively limited within
a designated range so that they would deem outcomes beyond that range to be highly unlikely. In this ease the
answer is clear. Both parties knew that the use of an objective price index injected a limited range of uncertainty
into their projected return on the contract .... Both consciously undertook a closely calculated risk rather than
a limitless one. Their mistake concerning its calculation is thus fundamentally unlike the limitless conscious
undertaking of an unknown risk which Essex now posits.
Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
73. Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 440.
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event, however unexpected its occurrence might have appeared at the inception of the
agreement. 74 Westinghouse's willingness to bind itself to a long-term contract in the
infant nuclear energy industry operated as an assumption of risk of increased costs
that ultimately resulted in losses greater than one hundred million dollars. 75 On
appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit recognized Westinghouse's impossibility de-
fense. Since impossibility in Westinghouse was due to the federal government's
unforeseeable discontinuance of reprocessing services for commercial nuclear power
plants, the court relieved Westinghouse from its reprocessing contract. 76 In discuss-
ing the government's attempts to induce commercial investment in the nuclear arena
by reducing risks for commercial actors, 77 the court of appeals indicated that
Westinghouse had not acted in conscious ignorance of extreme risks, but instead had
unfortunately relied on government promises.
B. The Need for a Totality of Circumstances Test to Assess Assumption of Risk
In the NIPSCO decision, Judge Posner noted that because price changes are
always foreseeable in long-term contracts, any supply contract that fails to protect a
party from unprofitable market fluctuations constitutes an explicit assumption of risk
and prohibits the application of the impossibility defense. 78 While advantages do
exist in effectively limiting the scope of the court's assumption of risk review to the
existence or nonexistence of a price term in a long-term contract, the costs of such
analysis are too great to justify its use. Arguably, an approach such as Judge Posner's
enhances judicial economy and promotes outcome predictability. 79 A limited exam-
ination, focusing only on certain contractual provisions, may simplify decisionmak-
ing and may conserve both courts' and litigants' resources. The inherent inflexibility
of the court's review may also make results of litigation more consistent. Parties
might more accurately predict outcomes of potential litigation and plan in accordance
with anticipated rulings before entering into contractual relationships. These are
possible benefits of judicial examination that is limited to whether certain price terms
are included in a contract and that is undertaken to determine how contracting parties
intended to assign particular risks.
Notwithstanding these benefits, a court's failure to analyze all circumstances
surrounding contract formation ultimately disserves commercial actors. A more
realistic determination of which party assumed the risk of an event emerges from a
comprehensive analysis of the environment embracing the creation of a contract. In
74. Id. at 458. The district court in Westinghouse noted the distinction made in ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70,
indicating that there is "an important difference between conscious and unconscious ignorance of material fact." Id. The
Westinghouse opinion stated that as to the facts before it, "there can be no doubt that the parties entered [their]...
contract in a state of 'conscious ignorance."'" Id.
75. Id. at 448.
76. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1574 (1988). In Florida Power, the court found on the same facts as Westinghouse "a textbook illustration of the
circumstances warranting the application of the doctrine of impracticability/impossibility of performance as a valid excuse
for breach of a contract." Id. at 265.
77. Id. at 246-47.
78. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986).
79. See. e.g., Halpern, supra note 15, at 1164 n.174 and accompanying text.
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reviewing impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose claims, the
foreseeability of the contingency, the nature and purpose of the contract, the course
of bargaining, and the ability to insure against loss should all be considered in
discerning party intent. Additional factors unique to certain contractual situations
may also provide insight into what risks of performance the participants in fact
assumed.80 In contrast, a more restricted analysis ignores commercial reality, places
burdens on contracting parties, and even deters some individuals from undertaking
any obligation whatsoever. It may also fail to conserve any significant amount of
judicial resources.
Fears that expanding review will waste judicial resources may be overstated.
Because impossibility defenses are often pled as a part of complex litigation, courts
already may need to review all the circumstances surrounding contract formation to
assess the validity of other claims such as mistake,8t warranty, or breach of
contract. 82 Frivolous impossibility claims would be deterred if courts treated the
presence of a fixed-price contract or a particular pricing provision as a rebuttable
presumption that risk had been accordingly assigned. Moreover, if courts allowed
commercial impracticability defenses only when the claiming party could show by
clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the parties was not to assign the risks
of certain events, many meritless suits would be defeated. 83 Finally, courts are
always free to eliminate frivolous impossibility claims by imposing sanctions against
a party presenting such a claim 84 or to grant summary judgment against the pleading
party. Under the rebuttable presumption standard suggested, a court would grant
summary judgment when no reasonable person could find that the evidence
introduced by the claiming party clearly and convincingly outweighs an initial
80. In a thorough review of the environment surrounding contract formation, the district court in ALCOA, 499 F.
Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), explored the relationship of the contracting parties, the event triggering losses for defendant,
and the parties' attempt to limit faulty prediction of events. Judge Teitelbaum found that even though ALCOA had not
provided a price floor provision in its contract with Essex, ALCOA had not assumed the risk of an oil embargo that
ultimately inflated the cost of performance. Id. at 66-67. After examining the totality of circumstances existing at the time
of contracting, the district court found there had been no allocation of such risk:
In the context of the formation of the contract, it is untenable to argue that ALCOA implicitly or expressly
assumed a limitless, if highly improbable, risk. On [the] ... record, the absence of an express floor limitation
can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed the risk too remote and their meaning too clear to trifle
with additional negotiation and drafting.
Id. at 69. The outcome in the ALCOA case has been criticized, but regardless of whether the facts of the case supported
Teitelbaum's finding that ALCOA should benefit from judicial reformation of the contract, the assumption of risk analysis
was reasonable and cognizant of commercial reality. For a thorough discussion of the ALCOA case and its impact on
commercial impracticability, see Halpern, supra note 15. See also Dawson, supra ncte 15; Court-Imposed Modifications,
supra note 15.
81. See, e.g., Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. Liquidation Trust v. Goschie Farms, Inc., 51 Wash. App.
484, 754 P.2d 139 (court also reviewing mistake claims), review granted, 11 Wash. 2d 1012 (1988).
82. Republic Floors of New Engl., Inc. v. Weston Racquet Club, Inc., 25 Mass. App. 479, 520 N.E.2d 160 (1988)
(claims asserted included warranty and breach).
83. Introduction of evidence tending to prove that the initial presumption is inappropriate might be affected by the
parol evidence rule. For example, in fixed-price contracts or in those contracts in which a price formula was used, the
presence of an integration clause might bar the admission of evidence that otherwise might have rebutted the presumption
that all risks were assigned by the agreement. In this case, the rebuttable presumption would operate more as a conclusive
presumption and commercial impracticability and frustration defenses would probably fail.
84. FED. R. Ctv. PRoc. 11.
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presumption that the risks of a subsequent event were assigned by explicit contract
provisions. 85
Given the courts' capacity to expunge most frivolous impossibility claims in the
early stages of litigation, the absence of a contract term should not constitute
conclusive proof that the parties intended particular risk assignment. Indeed, limited
extrapolation to discern party intent exercises the fiction that parties contemplate all
risks associated with performance to attach based upon the inclusion or the omission
of a price provision. Sometimes, the assignment of risk in such a manner is the
purpose of the agreement. But under the onus of a conclusive presumption, allocation
of risk occurs when the parties contract, even if the occurrence of a particular event
was rather unlikely and the omission of a term expressly charging a party with related
risks of performance did not represent affirmative risk assignment.
Certainly, the existence of certain price terms may be highly probative of the
parties' attempts to apportion risks at contract formation; however, Judge Posner's
summary treatment is nevertheless inappropriate because it fails to accommodate the
intrinsic complexity of commercial practice. The rationale for expanding contractual
defenses to include notions of commercial impracticability as well as those of
objective impossibility is to align the law with market realities. 86 Implying from the
absence of a pricing condition that the parties intended the buyer to assume all risks
of increased prices, as NIPSCO and other cases have posited, 87 does not adequately
reflect the process by which buyers and sellers contract.8 8 Indeed, contracting parties
may remain intentionally silent about complex issues under the impression that, if
problems arise, "attorneys will sort things out." 89 Parties may also find it inefficient
to dicker over every possible contingency, especially if its occurrence is unlikely.
Even where parties do not arrive at a meeting of the minds as to the allocation of
risks, for example, when their dickering proves fruitless, resultant contractual silence
might nonetheless lead to court-extrapolated assigned assumption of risk under Judge
Posner's analysis. 9°
The failure to employ a totality of circumstances test to determine assumption of
risk not only falls to appreciate the complexity of the marketplace, 9t but as a
85. FED. R. Civ. Poc. 56. See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) ("Motion for
summary judgment... necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial
on the merits.").
86. See generally Gillette, supra note 15, at 534; Prance, supra note 15, at 477; Excusing the Impracticable, supra
note 15, at 591,
87. See supra note 71.
88. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Parties to a contract
are not always able to provide for all the possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot agree, often
simply because they are too busy."); Prance, supra note 15, at 486.
89. For example, while both parties to shipping contracts understood that the Suez Canal might be closed, neither
inserted terms in their contracts with the understanding that, if shipments had to be made via the Cape of Good Hope,
"they would leave it to the lawyers to sort out." Ocean Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugina), 2 Q.B. 226,
233-34 (1964), quoted in Gillette, supra note 15, at 536-37 n.55.
90. For a discussion of contractual silence and court assigned assumption of risk, see Gillette, supra note 15.
91. For an economic analysis of efficiency and contract, see Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 15. Judge Posner
acknowleges that parties might not contract around rules of contract law even if the parties believed those rules inefficient
or inappropriate when they negotiated: "[TIransaction costs [or the costs of 'contracting around' contract law] may ...
outweigh the gains from a more efficient rule." Id. at 89.
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consequence, it also burdens those who wish to enter into contractual relationships.
Indeed, contract formation in certain areas of commercial activity may effectively be
precluded if a totality of circumstances test is not applied. Requiring a party to
bargain for-indeed, to insist upon-the inclusion of contract provisions that guard
against almost all risks of performance results in great inefficiencies. Economic
resources are wasted by the negotiation of terms that reasonable parties might
otherwise find superfluous but that are nonetheless dickered over out of fear of later
improvident performance. For example, it can usually be expected that contracting
parties will include clauses in contracts that address events that are sufficiently
foreseeable and probable to warrant discussion during contract negotiation. After
reviewing the totality of circumstances surrounding contract formation, a court could
reasonably conclude that the failure to bargain for such a price term given the
foreseeable need to address its subject matter operates as an implicit risk assignment.
Without a totality of circumstances test, however, a court's risk assessment is
identical whether or not the associated contingency was so unforeseeable or so
unlikely to occur that it did not justify circumspection during contract negotiations.
For instance, in Westinghouse,92 the expectation of the parties was clearly that the
government would continue its assistance in the commercial nuclear energy field.
The district court was willing to award millions of dollars in damages for breach
because Westinghouse failed to include a clause in its contract safeguarding the
company against possible cessation of government aid.93 The appellate court
disagreed, failing to find that the contract necessarily reflected an intent to assign risk
under these circumstances. Instead, the Fourth Circuit looked to the circumstances
surrounding contract formation and allowed defendant's impracticability claim.94
As the court of appeals reasoned in Westinghouse, it seems inequitable to expect
parties to bear the consequences of failing to provide for unpredictable or unlikely
occurrences simply because a reviewing court refuses to expand its factual inquiry.
When courts require parties to adhere to contractual obligations notwithstanding the
occurrence of unexpected circumstances, often the result is to penalize a "non-
negligent" party. Specifically, if a reasonable contracting party would not find it
necessary to dicker over an excusing clause, it is harsh to impose the burden of
performance regardless of the effects of an unusual happening merely because an
excusing clause was omitted. 95 Moreover, the performance bargained for will not
always be performance that a reasonable person would have proposed if the
subsequent disruptive event had been somewhat predictable when the contractual
relationship was created. Requiring performance under unexpected circumstances
92. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
93. Id. at 457.
94. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1574 (1988). See also supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
95. Allowing a party successfully to assert impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose notwithstanding
that party's failure to provide for protective contract clauses does not necessarily encourage sloppy negotiations. When
parties have not addressed a particular issue during negotiation, sensibly believing it irrelevant, the omission of a related
exculpatory contract provision is not necessarily the result of unsophisticated or careless negotiation and denying
impossibility claims in these situations will not create a disincentive to cautious contracting.
[Vol. 50:163
CONTRACTUAL IMPRACTICABILITY
could result in a windfall to the opposing party. 96 Indeed, concern over the windfall
that buyer Essex Group would receive if an aluminum supply agreement was not set
aside was expressed in ALCOA.97
Finally, without a totality of circumstances test, formation of contracts may
prove too burdensome or risky to undertake at all. Should one party fail to speak to
an unlikely event, he may, absent any real negligence, suffer the risks of its
occurrence and bestow unexpected benefits upon the other promisor. Such an
outcome is particularly likely in areas of commercial activity in which the events
affecting performance are in a state of constant flux. Even in these areas, parties may
wish to bind themselves, contemplating performance to be in accordance with
reasonable expectations about the future. A limited analysis similar to that found in
Judge Posner's NIPSCO decision, however, may dissuade contract formation when
parties fear that the obligations they originally intended to assume may be expanded
by judicial intervention and additional risks perhaps allocated after terse review of
contract provisions alone.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the history of contractual excuse relating to impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration of purpose suggests a continuing aversion to
previously wooden application of those doctrines. The NIPSCO decision illustrates
the difficulties courts encounter while attempting to make judicial authority reflect
the growing complexity of the marketplace. In refusing to look beyond the contract
and its price terms in his analysis of assumption of risk, Judge Posner limits the
usefulness of the impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose defenses.
Instead of narrowing the scope of judicial review of contractual relationships when a
party pleads excuse to an obligation, a more exhaustive analysis of circumstances
surrounding the agreement should be conducted. Only from a study of the totality of
circumstances that embraced contract formation can courts determine when, in
situations created by a rapidly changing commercial environment, parties intended to
be bound.
Susan E. Wuorinen
96. while commentators have suggested that judicial remedies available under the defense of commercial
impracticability should include reformation of the original contract, judicial adjustment of contractual obligation remains
a disputed topic. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 15; Halpern, supra note 15, at 1178 ("For the present, the context
should remain one of 'excuse,' an all-or-nothing solution, however unsatisfying that may be."); Trakman, supra note 15;
Comment, Relief from Burdensome Long-Term Contracts: Commercial Impracticability, Frustration of Purpose, Mutual
Mistake of Fact, and Equitable Adjustment, 47 Mo. L. REy. 79 (1982) (authored by Stephen Hubbard).
97. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 66 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See also supra note 96.
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